
W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
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March 10, 1977

TO: Dr. Shulman

FROM: W. Averell Harriman

It seems to me that Cy will have to clarify Brezhnev's interpretation of our relations under detente on Human Rights, as he described it to me in the attached extract from our June 1974 talk. After all, the Soviets have not hesitated to continue to criticize us whenever they wished in the press and in speeches by Brezhnev.

I think Brezhnev's speeches and other Soviet statements should be checked to give Cy the quotations he needs to use if necessary.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: USSR
 General Secretary of CPSU Leonid Brezhnev
 Assistant to General Secretary Andrey
 M. Aleksandrov
 Interpreter Viktor Sukhodrev, Ministry
 of Foreign Affairs

USA
 Honorable W. Averell Harriman
 Curtis W. Kamman, First Secretary,
 American Embassy Moscow

TIME: 11:00 a.m. to 2:10 p.m., June 4, 1974

PLACE: Brezhnev's Office, The Kremlin

1. Brezhnev greeted Harriman and posed for pictures. Harriman inquired about Brezhnev's recent health, and Brezhnev said he had been suffering from bursitis. After these preliminaries, the talks moved to the table adjacent to Brezhnev's desk.

2. Brezhnev said he knew Harriman--by the policy he had espoused over the years. He remembered Harriman from the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt, when Harriman had been Ambassador.

3. Harriman recalled that his first visit to the Kremlin was on September 7, 1941. But his first visit to the USSR had been in 1926. His long talks with Stalin had laid the basis for Lend-Lease. He asked where Brezhnev was at that time.

4. Brezhnev said he had already been on the front in September 1941. When the war broke out, he had been First Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk oblast party committee. He had immediately volunteered for the front. He had remained in military service throughout the war, ending with the Victory Day parade in Moscow in May 1945.

American Embassy Moscow
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-2-

5. Harriman recalled that Stalin had given him the horse on which Gen. Antonov rode to take the salute in the victory parade. Brezhnev said Antonov had once been his chief of staff on the southern front, then was promoted to Moscow. Harriman recalled that Antonov had become Chief of the General Staff. Brezhnev confirmed this, saying that Antonov had been a good officer and a cultured man.

6. Harriman mentioned that he had been in San Francisco on V-E Day in 1945. Molotov was there too. Aleksandrov interjected that this was during the period when the UN was being organized.

7. Harriman said he now wanted to talk about the future. He congratulated Brezhnev on progress made in bringing U.S.-Soviet relations back closer to those of World War II days. He expressed his gratitude as an American for the cooperation of Gromyko in Damascus in helping to reach a solution on disengagement. Now the scene would shift to Geneva, where the U.S. and USSR were Co-Chairmen. This made it possible to work together for peace in the Middle East.

8. Harriman said Brezhnev should be aware that he was dealing with a stable U.S. government. He would best be advised not to pay too much attention to U.S. domestic problems. Although it seemed likely that the House would vote impeachment, the Senate was not likely to convict by the required majority. Even if conviction were voted, however, the USSR would be dealing with Ford and Kissinger, and this meant for the next two years American policy would be stable. | | ✓

9. Harriman thought the most likely candidates in 1976 would be Ford and Edward Kennedy. Of course, one couldn't be sure this far in advance. In any event, there would be a new President. Harriman noted that Brezhnev knew Kennedy, knew his policies. He confirmed that the Democratic Party firmly favored cooperation with the USSR, except possibly for one Senator whose name need not be mentioned.

-3-

10. Brezhnev reacted animatedly, saying indeed he did not want to hear that name. He disliked demagogues.

11. Harriman continued by expressing the hope that Brezhnev could play a role in undermining this man's influence, which in any event seemed to have diminished somewhat of late. He assured Brezhnev that the man would not get the nomination. Brezhnev said he was sorry he didn't care for whiskey--otherwise, he would have some handy and would immediately propose that both he and Harriman drink to that.

12. Harriman cautioned that this man nevertheless has influence and cannot be entirely disregarded. It was important to handle the situation in a way that would reduce his influence. Harriman thought a settlement in the Middle East would go a long way toward that goal. In addition, Harriman made bold to suggest, one should not get angry with him, nor do counterproductive things. (Aleksandrov chimed in to provide a Russian equivalent for counterproductive--"reverse effect"). Brezhnev said he had never mentioned the man's name in public--only in private conversations. Aleksandrov observed that the Soviet press had shown great restraint toward him also.

13. Harriman made it clear that his advice applied not just to public remarks but policies. The USSR would do well to eliminate unnecessary controversy. It could, for example, keep up the flow of Jews to Israel and dispose of spectacular emigration cases generously.

14. Harriman said he was glad President Nixon would soon be visiting the USSR. He hoped more progress could be achieved along the lines of what had already been done. Naturally, as the U.S. negotiator for President Kennedy in the Limited Test Ban agreement of 1963, Harriman was especially interested in progress on agreements to limit nuclear weapons. The Limited Test Ban had been an opening wedge. Harriman believed most Americans agreed with him that progress in this area was very important. He asked

-4-

Brezhnev to take advantage of the fact that in Kissinger the USSR could deal with a man of sharp mind and fertile imagination. Now was the right moment to seek essential equivalence (explained by the interpreter to Brezhnev as "comparative equality," ensuring no unilateral advantage to either side).

15. Harriman said what was needed was a formula under which both sides would not feel the other was ahead in nuclear weapons. The Soviets enjoyed a throw-weight advantage, while the U.S. had more warheads with greater accuracy. Harriman said he didn't want to get into details, but merely point out that it would be easier now--i.e., in the next year--to achieve equivalence than at some later date.

16. Harriman felt that it would be easier to reach agreement if the facts were known on each side. He noted that the Pentagon exaggerates things, and the Soviet Union for its own part doesn't tell the whole story regarding relative defense capabilities. At some point, matters must be taken out of the hands of experts and dealt with on a political basis. Brezhnev commented that the Pentagon exaggerated especially when it wanted budget appropriations.

17. Turning to Europe, Harriman said he thought further progress could be made in this region too. CSCE was important, and the reduction of forces was especially significant in the mind of the U.S. public. Force reduction would lead to great enthusiasm for improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

18. In conclusion, Harriman said, he was gratified over trade. He offered congratulations on the recent fertilizer plant deal and said that if several more large contracts could be signed, this would go far to promote confidence. This was especially true of contracts with the better-known U.S. firms.

-5-

19. At this point, Brezhnev offered tea or coffee. Harriman recalled an amusing story of Khrushchev's asking a crowd in front of the Palace of Congresses whether he deserved the dinner that was given him after signing the Limited Test Ban. Brezhnev said Harriman's work over the years had earned him more than a cup of tea.

20. Brezhnev said he was delighted to meet Harriman, a leading political figure of the U.S. He expressed appreciation for the policy Harriman had always pursued toward the USSR. It was not a casual remark he had made ~~that he knew Harriman by his policies~~. He felt this meeting was very important, particularly since both he and Harriman were of a generation that had witnessed great events in the world, including World War II. The War has not been forgotten, and now the post-war period has brought new risks in the form of atomic weapons. All this has enormous political significance. Leaders of all states are obliged to take this into account and draw the proper conclusions.

21. Brezhnev noted the role played in this period by Roosevelt and by Harriman personally. The greatest fact was that the U.S. and USSR had fought Fascism together. We all have bowed our heads before the graves of those Soviet and American soldiers who died in World War II. Brezhnev recalled that he was in Murmansk a few years ago and was told of the lives lost by U.S. navy men who helped the USSR. He had bowed his head at their graves. A good, correct political conclusion ought to have been drawn from the War, but instead the Cold War emerged after World War II. This had cast people into the gloom of an arms race, disputes, and mutual fear.

Subsequent
22. Brezhnev told a story of a conversation with his father that had made a great impression on him. His father had asked just before the war, at a time when Hitler was overrunning Czechoslovakia and France, "What's the highest mountain in the world?" Brezhnev had answered, "Everest."

And, his father continued, "What's the height of the Eiffel Tower?" Brezhnev had told him, "About 300 meters." His father, a steelworker, had said that blood was being spilled throughout Europe, and what should be done was to erect a steel tower on top of Everest, build a scaffold on it, and hang Hitler and a dozen others for all the world to see. Brezhnev had considered this a fantasy at the time, but then the war began. And when it was over, the Nuremberg trials condemned the "warmongers" just as Brezhnev's father had suggested. Brezhnev said this conversation with his father had left an indelible impression on him, on his policies, his ideology, his psychology--indeed, his whole work and life.

23. Moreover, on the front, Brezhnev had seen too much suffering. That was why he stood for peace, for friendship, for good relations among nations irrespective of their systems. He said it was Soviet policy to try to improve relations with Western European countries and elsewhere, but the United States was especially important. He was happy that in this he enjoyed the confidence of the whole party and people. For a political leader, it was a matter of great satisfaction when not only one's own people but the peoples of the world supported one's policies. Of course, certain people didn't agree, and they intentionally distorted things. But the majority approve and support the peace policy.

24. Brezhnev said he wanted to stress that it was one thing to proclaim a policy, but it was something else to carry it out well. It would not be immodest to say that he and the entire CPSU Central Committee were working to implement the policy, and their work had met with some success. Precisely in this context Brezhnev viewed U.S.-Soviet relations.

25. Brezhnev gave President Nixon and his Administration high marks for realistically perceiving the world, for perceiving the reality that existed at the moment when the President came to Moscow in 1972. Brezhnev admitted that he spoke about that moment with some emotion, since the President had come at a difficult time during the course of the Vietnam War. It had not been easy for the USSR to

-7-

receive him at that time. But it was a moment when both leaders had looked to the distant future, and had taken a positive direction. They had decided to move from the Cold War to detente and to gradually improve relations between the two great powers. And beyond that, they had agreed to gear their policies toward a general easing of tensions in the world.

26. No problems faced by President Nixon at home could detract from the significance of what was done in 1972 and 1973. History would give its due to these events. Perhaps most Americans did not realize the importance of those first few minutes of conversation with President Nixon in 1972, which had had a decisive effect. The President had sat right where Harriman was now sitting, alone with Brezhnev except for the interpreter. The President had said, "I know you are loyal to your system and we are loyal to ours. So let's put this question aside and build a good relationship despite this difference in systems." Brezhnev said he had given the President his hand in friendship and had agreed. Ever since that time, Brezhnev and the President had conducted their policies on that basis and it would continue in the future. In brief, there would be no interference in one another's internal affairs, and the two countries would subscribe to peaceful coexistence. A whole series of political and economic agreements had been reached on this basis.

27. Brezhnev said he had been very satisfied when he returned from Washington in 1973. It seemed in his conversations with American officials, businessmen, Congressmen and others that a road had been built toward friendship. The task now was to widen this road to become a highway, to quicken the pace of cooperation. The treaties signed were, of course, important. And the people had widely supported the two Summit meetings. All this gave new stimulus to forward movement.

28. Since then, Brezhnev had seen many high-level American visitors to the Soviet Union. He had never begrudged the time, nor had his colleagues.

29. Brezhnev noted that the Soviet election campaign was drawing to a close. All the candidates for membership in the Supreme Soviet had been making speeches, many of which were devoted mainly to domestic goals and problems. But every candidate had also spoken out in favor of the peace policy, especially good relations with the U.S. This was not a fact to be overlooked: the candidates had to address people in all walks of life, of all nationalities.

30. Brezhnev said his own election speech would be delivered on June 14, the last in the campaign series. He would speak about U.S.-Soviet relations, about the results of 1972 and 1973, as well as the anticipated results of the 1974 forthcoming meeting with President Nixon. He would speak of peace, friendship, non-interference, and the development of relations in the fields of culture, economics, science and tourism. This would constitute the political platform for his election to the Supreme Soviet.

31. Harriman interrupted to ask whether it was premature to congratulate Brezhnev on his re-election. Brezhnev said it was too soon.

32. Brezhnev said he wanted to mention a very specific question. He had seen many Americans in Moscow, and this was a good sign for the future. Among those had had received were Shultz, Hammer and Kendall--the latter just yesterday. And now he was seeing Harriman. But it had made an especially deep impression on him to meet Sen. Kennedy. The Senator had come to this very office, with his wife and children, and they had held a good, wide discussion. Brezhnev said he had been very frank with Kennedy. He had concealed nothing. And he was deeply impressed by the meeting. Not only was it useful to talk politics with Kennedy--and this had been a rather general discussion--it was a pleasure to know him as a person. Political leaders are, after all, human beings, and it was in this sense that Kennedy had made the deepest impression. He was "simpaticzny," a word which is admittedly sentimental but has a certain meaning.

33. Brezhnev said he had been pleased to learn that some of Kennedy's views coincided with his own general approaches to policies. He had not discussed the U.S. internal situation or President Nixon's problems. He had been interested to learn that Kennedy had been the author of a proposal for an underground test ban, which the Soviet Union also favored. There had been no discussion with Kennedy about his possible candidacy in 1976--Brezhnev had not wanted to broach this subject since he felt it was inappropriate for him to get involved in U.S. internal affairs. ←

34. Harriman said he thought Kennedy had not yet decided whether to run, but the pressures to do so would be sufficiently great that he would probably decide affirmatively. Brezhnev reiterated that he had not wanted to put this question to Kennedy. Harriman said he would be glad to answer any political question Brezhnev wanted to ask about the U.S.

35. Brezhnev said he might accept that offer a bit later. He then turned to a brief mention of MFN tariff treatment for the USSR, saying that the Soviet Union had been promised MFN but viewed the present situation with understanding.

36. Brezhnev alluded to the forthcoming visit of President Nixon. He recalled that he had kept in touch since the 1973 visit through Ambassador Dobrynin, the State Department, Gromyko and others who had seen the President. Now the Soviet Union was preparing for another Summit. He stressed that all preparations were being directed toward reaching new agreements, if possible of even greater significance than in previous years. The most difficult and complex question was, of course, SALT. ←

37. Brezhnev said that when the first SALT agreement had been discussed with President Nixon, at the stage when they began to discuss numbers he had told the President that both countries had adequate national means of verification to determine with great precision the defense capability of the other side. Hence it was possible to base an agreement on equality for both sides.

-10-

38. Unfortunately, Brezhnev continued, some people in the U.S. had tried to distort the agreement and had accused the Administration of having been tricked. What was the purpose of this propoganda? Brezhnev did not know, but it did not help in reaching new agreements. It raised doubts among people in the U.S. that perhaps the USSR really has stronger defenses than the U.S. In fact, the U.S. enjoys a certain advantage which has not been taken into account. The first SALT agreement applied only to armaments located on the territories of the two signatories. It did nothing about forward-based systems. Nevertheless, the USSR had agreed to it.

39. Brezhnev felt that in the frank discussions he would be having with President Nixon it would certainly be possible to find the strength and the will to reach mutually acceptable formulas for equality. Perhaps if more time is needed, there could be a special provision or reservation on this question (i.e., apparently on FBS--CWK).

40. It was important now to think in terms of reductions, not only limitations. If this is not done, the only alternative is a continuing arms race. In this respect, statements by the Pentagon are out of place. Saying that the U.S. must be stronger to preserve the peace only misleads the public, and agreement is scarcely possible using such a formula. It will just lead to further disagreement.

41. Nevertheless, Brezhnev said, the Soviet Union believes that relations are developing well with the U.S., regardless of opposition in some circles. Economic and trade relations are good, plants are being built, there is an enormous construction project on the Volga, and trade turnover is now 20 billion (sic). There were deals pending for forestry resources, chemicals and tourists--i.e., the construction of tourist hotels. Gradually the climate was improving in the economic sphere.

42. Brezhnev observed that the internal struggle in the U.S. was obviously getting more acute, but the USSR was optimistic. Realism must and would triumph in the end. (CWK Note--not clear whether the foregoing refers to economics or broader questions).

-11-

43. Concerning the Middle East, Brezhnev said it was unfortunate that there was a problem there, but it was too late to do anything about that. What was important is that the U.S. and USSR had acted in a way that permitted the achievement of a ceasefire and gradual movement toward a peace settlement. That was a great accomplishment, done jointly under the appropriate UN resolutions. Brezhnev said Syrian disengagement now seemed close, following disengagement in Egypt. He said he had to admit that many difficulties lay ahead in the Middle East, but if the U.S. and USSR were able jointly to achieve a ceasefire and to a certain degree facilitate disengagement, this would promote a settlement.

44. Solution of the problem would require time, especially the Palestinian problem. Brezhnev said he could not say how to solve the Palestinian question. The USSR had no understandings with the Palestinians. To a certain extent, there was anarchism among them, and the USSR could not support that. He expected he would discuss this question with President Nixon.

45. As for other aspects of the Middle East, what was needed was guarantees for the sovereign existence and security of all states. With regard to Israëi, the USSR had signed the document creating the State of Israel. Nevertheless, if the U.S. and USSR found it possible to end the Vietnam War, they should be able to foster a settlement in the Middle East. Time would be needed to achieve this. Of course, the final settlement would have to be reached between the Arabs and Israel. The USSR did not place any obstacles in the way of Kissinger's efforts. Gromyko's trips to Syria were simply for the purpose of strengthening the general tendency. At the same time, there is no point to anyone patting himself on the back regarding the Middle East. Everyone must approach the question with seriousness.

46. Brezhnev said Soviet interests in the Middle East are straightforward. The USSR had no other interest but peace in a region located close to its own borders. It had no need for Middle Eastern oil or other resources. In fact,

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the Arab countries were always asking for Soviet aid. Brezhnev mentioned the new Israeli government with Rabin as Premier. He said he couldn't predict what positions Rabin would take, but the very fact of his coming to power was testimony to the fact that realism was forging ahead.

47. Brezhnev turned to the "Jewish question," which he said was something artificially blown out of proportion by the U.S. In point of fact, there was no such question within the USSR. Brezhnev had said publicly and officially that the USSR would permit all those who wished to emigrate to do so--to Israel, the U.S. or wherever they wished. This applied except in cases of persons in security occupations, as provided by Soviet law. Brezhnev said he was keeping watch over this question, and there were fewer exit applications recently. He said he expected this trend to continue and grow more pronounced. He was sure the whole question would evaporate in the near future, since there would be no reason for it. One should not seek to pursue an entire policy just for the sake of one or two names. Although there had been a time when the Arabs objected to emigration of able-bodied men to Israel, and had asked for a temporary halt, that period was now over.

48. Brezhnev repeated that he expected to discuss the whole Middle East question with President Nixon at the Summit; he believed the President wanted a peaceful settlement. It was hardly popular or possible to sustain a policy based on seizure of territory, not to mention that it was contrary to the UN Charter. That policy has been an obstacle, but now some mutual concessions might be achieved, depending on the two sides.

49. On European security, Brezhnev said the USSR had proposed a set of principles for the European Security Conference (CSCE) which could not have been more noble. They embodied peace, inviolability of frontiers, non-interference, good-neighborly relations, trade, national sovereignty and non-use of force or threat of force. He said the Soviet Union welcomed the support of the U.S. Administration for CSCE. He wanted to see CSCE successfully concluded at the highest level. People expected no less. Those who sought to raise obstacles were doing so artificially. There was no alternative except a reversion to enmity and mistrust.

-13-

50. Brezhnev pointed out that the agreements concluded with the U.S. had not been reached at the expense of either country's partners. The same principle could apply in CSCE. Every country should have good relations with every other country--for example, friendship between the U.S. and Canada. One could only conclude that there are forces which want to see a return of the Cold War, a renewal of tensions and a revival of fear. For this reason, Brezhnev valued the Nixon Administration's position on CSCE--to sign an agreement on the highest level in order to reach positive results.

51. Brezhnev philosophized that detente is not easy. It is a struggle waged without arms. But realism is breaking through. That makes us increasingly optimistic. One needs patience, and one must move step by step. But the USSR will do everything it can in that direction. Brezhnev said he felt the Nixon visit would help, that discussion of these questions would give new impetus to events in Europe and the entire world.

52. Brezhnev said he had an understanding with President Nixon about annual meetings. He assumed the President would adhere to this, and if it was not too premature, he could mention that he would be coming to the U.S. in 1975. He said he would come with good will. The election campaign would already be in progress, and that would be complicated since Brezhnev could not interfere. Aleksandrov noted that the elections were not due until 1976, but of course their influence would already be felt in 1975. Brezhnev said he would be unable to say whom he favored even if Harriman should ask. Harriman advised him to come and campaign for the right man. Brezhnev said the whole 250 million people of the USSR would vote for the man who avored improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.

53. Harriman said Brezhnev could best promote this goal in the U.S. by continuing to make progress along the lines he had charted with President Nixon. Brezhnev said he would do his best. Harriman thanked Brezhnev for his explanations, which he believed would help him to join Brezhnev in the cause of detente, which Brezhnev had described as a struggle without arms. He said he still had some influence--he was not entirely decrepit.

-14-

54. Brezhnev said he wanted to stress that he would not ignore the advice and recommendations Harriman had presented. Harriman said he felt it important to make one comment. Fear was the great enemy of confidence and trust. Certain people in the U.S.--honest men--see dangers from the USSR. Others, of course, have their own reasons for pursuing such a policy. But our soldiers, our scientists in the Pentagon are honest, and their fears must be overcome by further concrete agreements and by providing more information to people. The public must have the facts so that no one can exaggerate the fears and concerns.

55. Harriman added that he was appreciative of the fact that the USSR had seen fit to overlook some of the differences on Vietnam in receiving President Nixon in 1972. He also expressed his gratitude for the progress made in the agreements concluded by Brezhnev and the President. He hoped Brezhnev would have the wisdom to overlook some of today's differences. Then it would be possible to take some real steps to eliminate fears and increase confidence. Both Nixon and Brezhnev must set aside the advice of soldiers and experts at some point and reach agreement on the political level with respect to nuclear armaments.

56. Harriman recalled that Brezhnev had spoken of eventual reductions in addition to limitations of arms. He wondered if it would not be possible to begin reducing now, starting with some of the most fear-evoking weapons such as the heavy SS-9 missile. Couldn't the USSR eliminate a few of these to point the way? Harriman said he knew that this would have an enormous impact on people who seriously want to overcome the fears.

57. In addition, it would be helpful to have a reduction of forces in Europe--perhaps 10 per cent. This would be of great significance in the eyes of the American people.

58. Brezhnev agreed with the latter idea, claiming it as his own proposal. He had suggested reducing by 5 per cent, then waiting to see how things went, and taking another step of 5 per cent or so. However, people had distorted this proposal. He had first suggested it to Pompidou, and then to Nixon and Brandt. But the military had begun demanding "balanced" reductions, which amounted to asking for unilateral advantages. Brezhnev agreed that a political approach was needed.

-15-

59. Harriman said he was talking about a percentage reduction of U.S. and Soviet force--not those of the Warsaw Pact and the Western Europeans.

60. Harriman asked whether Brezhnev had any further questions. He added that he would continue to support U.S.-Soviet agreements, and wished Brezhnev success in the further pursuit of detente.

61. Brezhnev said he simply wanted to thank Harriman for coming to the Soviet Union and for coming to talk about important questions. He said he valued Harriman's influence and his efforts to make detente irreversible. He knew this conversation would remain in his memory for a long time. He wished Harriman many more years of fruitful political activity. He asked Harriman to convey regards to the President if he should see him, and to say that Brezhnev was looking forward to their meeting. He would try to reach good decisions at that time.

62. Brezhnev also asked to be remembered to Sen. Kennedy, whose visit remained fresh in Brezhnev's memory.

63. Harriman replied that he would continue to work to the objectives he had been talking about. He was not sure he would see the President, but he expected to see Henry Kissinger, an old friend, and would ask Kissinger to convey regards to the President. Harriman asked how to handle the press, and Brezhnev said the meeting was certainly not a secret one. At this point Aleksandrov handed the interpreter a typed press release, somewhat amended in pen and ink. It should be noted that Aleksandrov passed three or four notes to Brezhnev during his long statement. Brezhnev appeared to prefer that Harriman take the lead in outlining what he had in mind, and then proceeded to make his own lengthy statement in response.

-16-

64. [The release as issued]:

A. "On June 4, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev received in the Kremlin the prominent American political and public figure A. Harriman.

B. "In the course of the meeting there were discussed questions of relations between the USSR and USA in various fields, as well as some problems of the current international situation.

C. "L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that improvement of relations between the two countries meets the interests of the Soviet and American peoples and serves the cause of international detente and strengthening peace.

D. "A. Harriman for his part spoke in favor of developing relations between the USA and USSR of peace and businesslike, mutually advantageous cooperation.

E. "The meeting took place in an atmosphere of good will and of a constructive approach to the questions discussed. Taking part in the meeting was Assistant to the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU A. M. Aleksandrov."

65. The formal meeting ended at this point, but Brezhnev indicated that he had something to tell Harriman informally. He was proud to say he had just become a grandfather for the third time. (CWK Note: As far as the Embassy is aware, Brezhnev had one great-grandchild in June 1973.) He continued to talk about his grandchildren and Harriman's, reaching the point where there were tears in his eyes when he spoke about their futures and the need for peace. Harriman said he hoped they would grow up to be not only good citizens of their own country, but good friends as well. As Harriman was departing, Brezhnev showed him a photo he had received a few months ago of a young Brezhnev marching in the Victory Day parade in Moscow in 1945. He promised to send Harriman an autographed copy.

*He said
he must
Breznev
then
going
from
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during the...*

66. Harriman said to Brezhnev that this did not appear to be Stalin's office, to which he agreed. Aleksandrov told Kamman upon departure that Brezhnev's office had been fitted out relatively recently, and did not exist in the time of Stalin. He thought the office on the floor below, now used by Kosygin, was the one previously used by Stalin.